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Biographical Note
Leon Billings was born in Helena, Montana on November 19, 1937. His parents were Harry and
Gretchen Billings. His father was an editor and publisher of a progressive newspaper; his mother
was a crusading journalist. He graduated from high school in Helena, Montana in 1955, and
then attended Reed College for one year in Portland, Oregon. He completed his undergraduate
studies and took graduate courses toward an M.A. at the University of Montana at Missoula.
Billings worked as a reporter and organizer for farm groups in Montana and California. He
moved to Washington, D.C. on January 4, 1963. While in Washington, Billings worked for the
American Public Power Association for three years as a lobbyist. In March 1966, he was offered
and accepted a job on the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution on the Public Works
Committee. He worked for Muskie helping to coordinate work on environmental policy. From
1966 to 1978, he served as Muskie’s chief of staff. He served on the Democratic Platform
Committee staff in 1968 and in 1974, was co-chairman of a Democratic National Committee task
force on Energy and the Environment. He later served as President of the Edmund S. Muskie
Foundation; a tax-exempt foundation endowed with a $3 million appropriation from Congress to
perpetuate the environmental legacy of Senator Muskie.

Scope and Content Note

Interview includes discussions of: Environmental Subcommittee; Democratic Platform
Committee; Muskie’s speeches including the Democratic National Convention; 1968 campaign;
environmental legislation; 1969 Presidential campaign; Muskie’s legislative style; Earth Day
1970; Auto Emissions Bill; Clean Air Legislation; EPA years; Office of Environmental Quality;
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); and Muskie’s difficult relationships.
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Transcript
Don Nicoll: It is the 1st day of May, 2002, a Wednesday afternoon. We are in the offices of
Billings & Sturbitts, and this is the second interview with Leon Billings. Don Nicoll is the
interviewer. Leon, we had agreed at the end of our last session that we'd start talking about the
1968 campaign, beginning with the period leading up to the Democratic National Convention.
Leon Billings: I suppose this will develop as I talk, but in the course of my work on the
environmental subcommittee I came to know a young, very young lobbyist named Tom Boggs,
who was representing people who manufactured recreational vessels. And we had a provision
that I think was in one of the early water acts that required the installation of marine sanitation
devices, which his organization was opposed to. And over the period of that time he . . . . I
guess in '68 I was thirty-one, Tommy was probably twenty-seven or twenty-eight, and his father
was [U.S. Representative Hale Boggs (D-LA)] made chairman of the Democratic platform
committee. And so Tommy put together a team of people, Gene Thoreau, myself, others, to staff
the platform committee.
And this was sort of a, I had permission to do it, you know, and it's important to put it in a
historical context. In 1968, there were virtually no limitations on what a member of the Senate
or a member of the House could do with their staff. You could, you know, whether you did their
laundry or got their groceries or drove them around the state or whatever it was, those were more
common than they were exceptions. And there were no limitations on what staff could do
politically, you could be as active politically as we wanted. In fact, I don't even think there were
any limitations on our ability to contribute to our own bosses' reelection effort.
So anyway, I took on this responsibility and staffed some hearings that were held here, including
the famous confrontation between Phil Burton and Dean Rusk when Rusk had to leave the room

because Czechoslovakia had been invaded by the Russians. Anyway, we went off to Chicago, I
went off to Chicago with the platform committee, and Muskie showed up about a week after I
did. There were not a whole lot of Muskie staff around. Were you there?
DN:

Yes.

LB: Yeah, you were there, Sandy Poulin was there.
DN: Gayle [Cory] was not there. Ron [M.] Linton came, he was no longer on the staff at that
point.
LB: Muskie had a paucity of staff, you know, he had a bunch of, you were there primarily
because you were part of the Democratic delegation from Maine more than because you were
from Muskie's staff.
DN:

No, actually I wasn't there as a delegation member. I was there with Ed as his assistant.

LB: Oh, okay. And, you know, Ken Curtis and all those guys were sort of hanging out. And
about, on the day, I guess it was Wednesday, there were lots of rumors floating that [Hubert]
Humphrey was going to ask Muskie to be his running mate. So Muskie, or you, or both, tasked
Berl Bernhard and I to write an acceptance speech. So we went off into a corner room at the
hotel, which, the windows were open and there was all of this stuff going on in Grant Park, and
Dick Gregory and Gene McCarthy and so on, making speeches to stir up the crowd. Gail
Martin, who then I think worked for the Sergeant at Arms Office, was working with us
transcribing the speech. And we wrote and wrote and wrote. And I think to a degree the speech
got radicalized a little bit by what was going on in the world around us.
But around, and that, we started at nine o'clock in the morning; around four o'clock in the
afternoon we'd heard nothing. So we wrapped up the draft and went down to Muskie's suite and
you and Jane, and Ed and I think Sandy Poulin, there may have been other people there. Very
shortly after we got there Muskie got an invitation to go up and see Hubert [Humphrey]. And I
believe that was just shortly after four o'clock with the convention starting at seven o'clock,
which seemed like an extraordinarily short period of time to be making a decision like that. And
he went up, and my recollection is, too, he didn't want to look at the speech that we had drafted.
Whether that was because he thought it would jinx things, or because there was no reason to
waste time on it if he wasn't going to be nominated. And I think by then he pretty much figured
nothing was going to happen, time had passed. And, by the way, you're in a position to correct
me on any of this, but this is sort of my recollection.
DN:

Oh no, you're right.

LB: So he came back downstairs, and I may be creating words, but he said something like,
“Let me see the draft.” I mean, it was, there was no beating the chest, he's asked me to be vice
president. It was sort of a matter of fact, “Let me see the draft.” He read it and he said, “That's
all wrong, it's the wrong message for me.” And he said, “I guess I'll have to write it myself.”
And if I remember correctly, he took Sandy Poulin into the bedroom of the suite, dictated off the

speech, she came out and typed it, he worked on it a little bit, showed it to us, and I think he said,
“You may correct it technically but don't try to change the thrust of it.”
And for myself, and I think for Berl, we both thought it was a terribly calm and uninspiring
message, but we accepted his admonition and went down and got in Ken Curtis' car and had to
break through the demonstrators to go over to the convention. And then watched him perform
that speech. I guess perform is a good word, and it was a remarkable demonstration of his
intellectual capacity. Because, not only, I mean, nobody had any question that his speech would
be well delivered, but a lot of us had real reservations about how well it would be received. And
it was received just, it was exact, it was perceived by people as exactly the right tone. Didn't
upstage Hubert, was a “reach across the aisle” type, kind of speech, and was extremely well
received. That was certainly not the first time where my instincts differed from his and I lived
long enough to learn that I was wrong, but it was one of the more glaring examples of his
acumen and my lack thereof.
DN: There's a little footnote we might put in there, Leon, about that, the delivery or
performance of that speech. It was effective for both the audience in the hall, and for the
television audience. And he sensed the need to reach out to people at home watching the speech
on television, in a way that most orators did not. Most of the speeches from the podium at the
National Convention were delivered in the old fashioned stump speech style, which translates
very poorly into television, but Ed had this instinctive understanding of that.
LB: Well, before, and I just recall, before this event occurred, the, he was drafted either by
Carl Albert or the president, or both, to manage the debate on the Vietnam plank. And I was
tasked to write three minute speeches for the people who were going to speak on the pro plank
side, and his instructions were very clear. There were to be no pro Vietnam speeches, there were
to be conciliatory discussions of U.S. policy, but we were not to provide an opportunity for Phil
Burton and his gang to demagogue the issue.
And he was adamant not only about that, but that he got to select who would speak in favor of
the plank. And we had a list and he, not only, just to show you something about the hands-on
the nature of the man. Not only did he select the people, but he also selected the order in which
they would appear. And, I was busy literally backstage writing these speeches out, these three
minute speeches, and I can't remember, Gene Thoreau may have been back there writing with
me, because we had six or seven of them. And all of a sudden, onto the stage, out of order,
bursts Wayne Hayes of Ohio, who was not on our list. He got put into this by the White House
people who were running the convention. What was his name, Jack DN:

Valenti?

LB: No, no, Cranshaw or Kreslo, the guy that, the White House guy that was major domo of
the convention. And he, I mean he literally just interposed him into the . . . . And Hayes got up
there and gave this demagogic pro-Vietnam war speech that just completely, I mean Muskie was
fur-, he was beside himself with rage over this, him going on. And of course it gave Burton and
his crowd the opportunity to feed the animals, you know. [Abraham] Ribicoff, if you recall his
speech. But it was an interesting piece of history, all of which is clearly, I'm sure recorded on

tape somewhere, at least the speeches were. After the convention, he went off to, what was the
name of that, Waverly?
DN:

Waverly, Minnesota.

LB:

Did you go?

DN:

Uh-huh.

LB: And Jane, right, the three of you. And I'm not sure whether I went home, yeah, I guess I
did go home but I was only home for a couple days. And then I went off to advance his
appearance in San Francisco and Sacramento, which was really the only time I advanced on the
campaign. You will recall that during that time we were trying to write the, some Clean Water
Act amendments, and trying to correct a problem that we had with respect to liability for oil
spills that we had, a problem we had created when we wrote the '66 act, probably I created,
because I was naive. And in the process of correcting that problem we had, the Torey Canyon
broke up off the French coast, and some other incidents. Santa Barbara hadn't occurred yet but
there was another one.
DN:

What was the nature of the problem, by the way, with the clean up?

LB:

The problem with the law?

DN:

Yes.

LB: The 1924 Oil Spill Act created liability for the spiller. And Jim Wright of Texas got an
amendment into the conference agreement on the '66 Clean Water legislation that made that
liability triggered by gross negligence. And as I said, naiveté and inattentiveness, it slipped
through and so we were trying to correct it. And we tried to correct it in '67 and didn't get
anyplace. And then we passed, then we got into this whole idea of a comprehensive oil spill
liability scheme. And we passed what was then called the Water Quality Improvement Act.
And we, the House didn't do anything on it for a long time and Muskie was off on the campaign
trail and it was, must have been I guess September.
So all of a sudden the House decided that they were going to pass it so they, rather than go to
conference, they amended our bill and sent it back to us. We, and this was maybe two days
before we adjourned, and I called Muskie on the plane and I said, you know, “Here's what
they're doing,” you know, “we can accept their amendment or we can amend the bill and send it
back, because I don’t really want it to die on our court.” And he said basically, “Screw 'em, we'll
be back next year.” Not to suggest that he thought he was going to lose the vice presidency, but
he thought, Muskie always was prepared to wait for another year for a better outcome.
And so we sent the bill back to the House. And literally, the House, [Richard] Dick Sullivan,
some legislative maneuver, got it amended again and sent it back to us. And the Senate
adjourned sine die [indefinitely] when Charlie Hackney, who was the bill clerk in the House,
was pounding on the Senate door because he wanted the bill to die in the Senate chamber, not in

the House chamber. But it was a good example of Muskie's legislative style. Same kind of
posture he took with respect to the 1970 Clean Air Act when he said, you know, “Gentlemen,
I'll be back here next year and we'll start this process all over again. If you want to go home
without acting on this bill, it's up to you, but I'm not going to compromise.” And he basically
took that position, though it was by long distance from the plane.
And again, he was, because ultimately the oil spill bill that we passed, the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970, was even tougher than the one that died in 1968. And so each time it
came through it got tougher. And was the, just for the historical record, that provision of law
established the fundamental law on which Superfund is based. Because it also had a provision
that dealt with hazardous material spills and releases. And that section 311 of the Clean Water
Act is the predicate for all of the Superfund liability provisions. Muskie was not in the Senate,
he was in the State Department when Superfund ultimately passed in 1980. And people have
said to me, “Well, that's not a Muskie law.” I say, “Go back and look at the oil spill bill in
section 311, you'll find it.” In fact, the most controversial, progressive parts of Superfund were
written in 1970, not 1980.
DN: He was a recycler as well as a foundation builder. Even by remote control. So during the
campaign, at least the early part of the campaign, you were pretty much tied up with legislative
business.
LB: Yeah, yeah the, I came back after the Sacramento-San Francisco advance, and I was stuck.
I mean, you know, he made it clear to me, you made it clear to me, that somebody had to mind
the store, do the work. I wasn't very happy with it, I wanted to get on the, everybody else was on
the plane. I wasn't, but I survived that.
DN: In Washington during the '68 campaign, did you work with the Washington office of the
campaign? George Mitchell, John Martin and company, Berl?
LB: Not a lot. You know, I worked a lot with them in the early part of the presidential
campaign until paranoia took over that operation. But, you know, it's hard because, you know,
after the, one of the things that grew out of the '68 campaign was a conclusion that I drew. And
I'm sure I wasn't alone in that conclusion but, that we, and I'm sure you drew the same
conclusion because it happened, is that Muskie could no longer just get in the plane and bop off
and go give a speech someplace. He had to have somebody traveling with him.
(Tape paused for phone call)
He was obviously now a national figure. And I think the first trip he made after the '68
campaign was the Clean Air speech he gave in Louisville, Kentucky, and I traveled with him.
And then I, you know, I made a number of trips with him in early '69, the most memorable of
which was, he went off to campaign for John Melcher [in Montana]. John Melcher, who was
running for an interim Senate seat, House seat, that had been vacated when Nixon had appointed
Jim Battin to the court. And I went out to Montana a week early to visit my family and then
joined up with him in Great Falls, no, joined up with him in Billings, where he did an event for
Melcher. And then we flew to Great Falls in a two-engine plane, because I was admonished that

Muskie didn't ride in one-engine planes. And the, he made a speech there. And then we got on a
flight out of Great Falls to come back to Washington and we were in coach. And Senator
Muskie didn't like coach, but coach didn't like him either. This was a man whose legs were as
long as any person I've ever seen. And when he sat in coach he literally had his knees up to his
chin, and he was very unhappy. He was extremely unhappy about being in coach, and he made
sure I knew it. As if I had something to do with it.
And at one point he, he's talking about how he's been out there campaigning for six months, this
was June, the primary was in June, it was early June, late May, for six months, and gets a little
bit of regional news coverage, no national coverage at all. And he holds up this page of
Newsweek which shows Ted Kennedy holding up a school drawing that Patrick had done. He
said, “You know, I'm out there for five or six months campaigning on public policy issues and
making important statements and I can't get a goddamn story in the Washington Post. And Ted
Kennedy proves his kid is dyslexic and he gets a picture in the newspaper.” And he said, “I am
through. I'm going to go out and make speeches for money. I am not going to do this, I'm not
going to pursue this campaign any more. I am done.” And my recollection is he came back and
told everybody that, and he got off the campaign trail and we started off on these, making these
fifteen thousand or ten thousand dollar speeches. And then along came Chappaquiddick and he
was propelled back into it. And I honestly don't believe he was ever happy with that. I mean, I
think he would have been happy had he gotten off the '68 campaign and just gotten right on to
the '72 campaign, but I think once having gotten off he was not happy to get back on.
DN: At that point, were your duties more and more focused, or returning to focus on
environmental legislation?
LB: Yeah, I mean, the only travel I did with him was basically, he was making environmental
speeches, except Montana because of my, because that's my home. But yeah, we switched back.
You know, in '69 he held some hearings, and it was very difficult for the campaign. Not so
difficult in '69 and '70 because for practical purposes the campaign was run out of the Senate
office, as opposed to a campaign office. And he had it in his mind that he was going to continue
to be a United States senator and continue to do his job, so there was a lot of work to do. There
was, we had this Water Quality Improvement Act, the oil spill bill, we had to get through. He
had introduced Clean Air legislation which was going to be a major expansion on the '67 act,
which turned out to be a radical change from the '67 act. He was, you know, I can't really
comment on what, I mean, I know he was doing stuff in intergovernmental relations and so on.
So he was sort of in Washington four or five days a week, and then out, after Chappaquiddick,
out campaigning on weekends. He did not, my recollection is he did not make a lot of trips out
of town when the legislature was in session, unlike today's candidates. So yeah, my focus
shifted entirely back to that, from an occasional trip. I would, you know, draft some speeches,
and we had, I'm not sure whether Eliot [Cutler] was on the staff yet or not.
DN:

Eliot had come and stayed with us from '68 on.

LB: Anyway, so, we, you know, we were tasked to write speeches and we were expected to
answer mail, which was a great distraction. Plus, we were expected to perform a staff function

legislatively, which is very different than what staffs do now. His, the, what happened in the '69'70 period was, we had Earth Day in '70. We had a sort of a sea change of national focus from
the Vietnam war to domestic policy. Environment became sort of the release for all that pent up
frustration that people had held through the war. And he responded to that, even though at times
his response was personally unpleasant. His political and his philosophical response was very
aggressive, extremely aggressive while, you know, maintaining his insistence that this kind of
legislation be developed on a bipartisan basis.
The key, I learned early on, most liberals, and while Muskie was perceived as moderate he had
an extremely liberal voting record, as liberal if not more liberal than George McGovern, who
was considered a liberal. Most liberals didn't have the patience to sit out the more conservative
Republicans whose legislative strategy was to talk an issue to death. And Muskie would go to a
mark up or to a conference, and he would sit there like he had lead in his butt, and he would wait
and wait. He'd wait for a quorum, and when a quorum would come he would engage in debate
until essentially he wore down the opposition. And it was a great lesson which has actually
served me in good stead as a state legislator; to show up, stay, outstay the opposition, and just
wear them down, rather than letting them wear you down.
But he was just in that, that was true in the '72 Clean Water Act. We had, between the
subcommittee and full committee, we had something on, over forty business meetings, mark ups.
And this is when he's running for president mind you, which really infuriated McEvoy and
Bernhard and others who had other, and Eliot and other people who had plans for him elsewhere.
And then we had more than forty conference committee meetings. I mean, it was, no, actually I
think I misspoke, I think we had forty mark ups and conference committee meetings, but no
piece of legislation today has more than one or two. But it was a matter of just sitting through all
of the stones that could be thrown at him, until he finally got most of his way. And, I mean it
was a style that just was not imitated by progressive Democrats, they were all too intellectually
lazy and too impatient.
DN: Let's drop back a little bit to '70 and the Earth Day celebration. What was his connection
and yours to that event?
LB: Reluctant. The combined, I'm not, again, I'm not sure, I can't put together in my mind
where the campaign was in 1970, whether it was downtown or on the Hill. But the decisions, the
decision was made that he would start Earth Day with a sunrise ceremony on Cadillac Mountain,
on Mt. Desert Island. He would then, I believe, come south to Philadelphia, and there may have
been a stop in between there in Boston, but I'm not sure, but, I think there was. And then he
would, he'd make an Earth Day speech in Philadelphia. Then he would catch the train to
Washington and I would pick him up and take him down to that Shakespeare amphitheater on
the mall where he'd make an evening Earth Day speech.
And what I remember most about that has nothing to do with the day, there were two anecdotes.
One is, he had this Chrysler convertible. And I can't remember who went in and met him at the
train, but I was sitting out in the car and we had the car up on the curb, there was a fountain there
and so we had it up on the curb, so it would be out of traffic. And he came out and he was not
happy. Partially, he was late, partially he was tired, partially it had been a long day. But, you

know, it all sort of was welling up as he got in the car. And I just hit the accelerator, I shot off
the curb, and he looked at me and he says, “What are you, some kind of a goddamn cowboy?”
Then he got down there and he got up on the podium and, you know, I mean, one of the
magnificent things about Muskie is that he could be sitting in a private meeting with you just
tearing you to shreds and venting all kinds of fury and so on, and thirty seconds later be up
before a public crowd and you'd have no idea that the same guy you were just talking to was the
one that was talking up there. And he started out by saying, “It's so nice to see all of you young
people out there on the grass.” And, I mean, the place reeked of marijuana smoke. I to this day
don't know whether he meant that to be a double entendre, or whether it was just because of all
these people sitting out on the grass, but it brought down the house and he owned them, he
absolutely owned them. And then he made a great speech, and if I remember correctly it was
extemporaneous. I would even bet you we don't have it recorded. But, you know, it was one of
those moments where for thirty seconds you didn't ever want to see the S.O.B. again, and then
thirty seconds later you're so damned proud of working with him that it takes it all away.
DN: As you moved, 1970 was Earth Day, it was also the year of the Clean Air Act, and you
were talking about dramatic changes in that legislation.
LB: Yeah, he underwent somewhat of a metamorphosis in that legislation. Partially, Muskie
used to say, and I'm sure always thought, that the man who was in the middle was in control.
And I believe in retrospect that he worked very hard to create the middle so he could be in
control of it. In this particular year, he had a young and aggressive former attorney general from
Missouri, Tom Eagleton, who was new to the committee, been elected in '68, and a young and
very bright Howard Baker. Baker, a technocrat who had studied under Alvin Feinberg at Oak
Ridge, he was sort of a mentor of Baker's, had studied under him. And Eagleton, who had just
run a campaign focused on the fact that the government made promises and never did anything.
DN:

Excuse me, a correction, it's Alvin [M.] Weinberg, not Feinberg.

LB: No, Weinberg, yes, Weinberg, right. Anyway, Baker came up with, Baker believed that
you really had to tell businesses what to do and then accept the result, and Eagleton believed in
deadlines, and Muskie believed that no matter, there had to be a public policy basis for any kind
of a regulatory command and control statute. And so he said, “First thing we'd have to do is
protect public health. And I'm willing to go along with you, Howard, on achieving that through
setting emission standards, but I want it understood the emission standards have to be tough
enough to protect public health.” And there was a bit of a dynamic between the two of them.
Baker didn't want to go that far, and Eagleton wanted deadlines, and the deadlines complicated
how far Baker wanted to go. But Muskie said at one point, and I think this is probably in the
transcripts of the mark ups which we kept, that, and if not, maybe in admonition to me, he said,
“Once you get to policy, you can always give time. Time is your, time is the tool with which
you can be flexible.” So he was willing to give more time to achieve the health standards, but he
wasn't willing to not achieve the health standards.
In the process of that discussion, we were discussing the automobile and, auto emission
standards, and Muskie clearly wanted to get out in front of California on the auto emission

standards issue, and so he tasked me with calling John Middleton, who was then head of the
National Air Pollution Control Administration, and asking John what it would take in the way of
reductions from automobile emissions in order to remove the automobile from the national
pollution problem, at such point as you had a turnover in the vehicle population. A truly radical
idea, but an idea that was endorsed unanimously by the subcommittee as being the way to go,
and which some of them got nervous about later.
But the next day we had a business mark up at ten o'clock. And at nine forty-five I got a call
from Middleton who gave me the answer to the question, which I typed out on my own manual
typewriter, and with all the typographical errors, a one page memo to Muskie, which he then
read to the committee. And the committee voted, I believe unanimously, to adopt a standard that
required the auto industry to reduce their emissions by ninety percent by 1975, with a one year
waiver.
And that was one or two days before the Congress was scheduled to leave town for the August
recess. So Muskie ordered up a press conference and he presented the subcommittee's work,
which had not leaked, and, with Baker there, with Cooper there, with Eagleton there, and others.
I don't believe Jennings Randolph was there, he may have been. And the, I don't recall precisely
the reaction of the press, but I do recall precisely the reaction of the auto industry lobbyists who
just went nuts, screaming, “You haven't even held hearings on this! This is a brand new
proposal.”
And so the next day, Randolph told Muskie that he wanted to hold hearings, and Muskie said
“No,” which was sort of interesting because Muskie was only the subcommittee chairman. But
he said, “No, that would delay the process too much.” So he agreed to circulate the bill for
comment, and agreed that the comments would be treated as if they were part of a hearing record
and published and made available. And one of my recollections of that particular, he said, and
then the staff can work it out while we're gone in August. And I said, “Whoa,” I said, “wait a
minute.” I said, “I'm leaving for Maine tomorrow, too.”
But at any rate, we had a meeting. He left, it was a Thursday or Friday that this announcement
was made and he left, went off to Maine, went to the Allagash I think to go fishing. And so we
held two meetings hosted by Tom Jorling, who was the minority counsel, and myself, one on the
stationary source side of the law, and one on the mobile source side of the law. The one on the
mobile source side of the law was held on a Saturday morning because we really did want to get
out of town for vacation, and it was in the committee room and the auto industry lobbyists were
all there. And they, at one point Tom was describing what we did with auto emissions, and one
of the lobbyists said, “What you want us to do is all build a Volkswagen. You guys are nothing
but a bunch of goddamn Communists.” So it sort of went downhill from there. And after
Muskie came back we voted out of committee.
And during that time, the, for the first time in my recollection, the CEOs of the auto companies
actually came to Washington. They had always before sent either their chief engineers or their
political people, and in fact I think at that time only Ford had somebody of vice presidental rank,
Rod Markley, in Washington. And so, I think who showed up was Lee Iacocca who was then
with Ford, Pete Estes, who was then General Motors. I've drawn a blank on the guy from, John

Ricardo from Chrysler, and a guy named Jerry Myers who was vice president of American. And
they came into Muskie's office, which was then 221 was it, or something?
DN:

Right.

LB: And they sat down and they discussed the auto emissions. I think you may have been in
that meeting. And afterwards, I mean it was a very unproductive event, Muskie turned to us and
said, “If that's the quality of American business leadership, I can understand why the Japanese
are beating the hell out of us.” Do you remember that? And so then we got the bill out of
committee and had a fairly strenuous debate on the floor. The, at one point with Bob Griffin,
who ultimately didn't vote against the bill, it passed unanimously. I think it was something like
eighty-eight to nothing, and that's the occasion on which Gene McCarthy said to Muskie on the
way to the elevator, he said, well, Ed End of Side A
Side B
DN:

. . . of the May 1 interview with Leon Billings. And you can start on the conference.

LB: So we finally went off to conference and the, we had a meeting with the House, and it was
in that little conference room right near where the bomb went off sometime later. And, Muskie
thought he had an agreement, the House agreed to the auto emissions standards provision of the
bill. And so we went out and announced the agreement, and then, said we had to come back
after the election, there was going to be a lame duck session to work out the rest of the details.
And lo and behold, we got back, we had a letter from then secretary of HEW [Health, Education
and Welfare], Elliot Richardson, denominating the administration's objection to the legislation
and all of the House members suddenly lost their memory of the agreement that they reached
before the election. And needless to say, Ed Muskie was furious. And I think he was furious not
just because they lost their memory, but because it made him look foolish, having said that this
issue had been resolved.
So we continued to confer and the House conferee's in the '70 act, if I remember correctly, were
Harley [Orrin] Staggers, Paul [Grant] Rogers, and a very conservative Democrat from Oklahoma
named John Jarman, and Ancher Nelson of Minnesota, and I believe Jim Broyhill of North
Carolina. And Jarman’s family were big auto dealers in Oklahoma. And it came to pass that
then columnist Jack Anderson wrote a piece about John Jarman and the conflict of interest he
had on the Clean Air Act, and, to which I may have had something to do with. And John Jarman
ceased showing up at the conferences after that piece.
And we got down to the, basically the adjournment conference, it was just on the eve of
adjournment, and Muskie called the DemocraC, Senate conferees together in the secretary of the
Senate's office, or Sargent’s office, I'm not sure which. Anyway, he called us together and he
said, he instructed the staff to go out and come back that afternoon with a series of alternatives
that might resolve the differences with the House. And this may have been a moment in which I
felt more used than I've ever been. So Tom and I came back with three or four alternatives, and
we presented them to the committee. And if I remember correctly the conferees were Randolph

and Benson and Muskie and Eagleton and, you know, there were seven or nine, something like
that. And Muskie listened very attentively to our presentation, and then he said, “Everyone of
those proposals suggests a two-year extension of the deadline.” I said, “Yes,” because that was
the issue. And he said something like, “Well, god dammit, I'm not going to go in the House and
propose that we gut the goddamn bill. And I don't think anybody in this conference committee is
going to go in there and tell the House that we want to gut the goddamn bill. What have you
guys been doing for the last two hours?”
Well, I mean it was a tour de force. Not even Jennings Randolph, who would have killed for that
extra year, said anything. And Muskie said, “We want to go back in there and tell them that
we're going to stick with the proposals that passed the Senate.” And everybody nodded their
head, and they went back in. And Muskie said, “No, we met, we voted, and we decided not to
send it, so if you guys can't accept our proposition, we'll see you next year.” And Staggers said,
“Give us a moment.” And they went out and huddled, then came back, and he, Paul Rogers,
who'd always been with us. And John Jarman's proxy came out of Stagger's pocket and he voted
it to get it out of committee.
And we sent it down to the White House, and the, there were all kinds of rumors about what
happened to the bill. The best rumor was, or the best story was, one of the White House people,
a guy named John [C.] Whitaker, who was an assistant to Ehrlichman, said that the bill had
actually been sitting on the radiator in somebody's office and had fallen behind it, and that's why
it was so late in getting signed. And, but you know, there were lots of rumors, that Nixon was
going to veto the bill. So Randolph went down to the White House and saw the president and
begged him to sign the bill, and I think [John Sherman] Cooper may have been with him. And
all of a sudden there was this, the bill was signed I believe on December 31, 1970.
Muskie was in Maine for Christmas. But these, the gang in the White House who couldn't shoot
straight, invited Randolph and Cooper and several other members of Congress. Did not invite,
specifically did not invite Senator Muskie to the signing. Well, he wouldn't have come back to
Washington for the signing anyway, but we managed to get a headline in the front page of the
Washington Post, which said “Nixon signs Clean Air Act, Muskie not invited,” which was a lot
better than the alternative.
You know, we didn't, I didn't talk about, one of the key things that happened in 1970 was the
National Environmental Policy Act. The National Environmental Policy Act was a product of
Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson of Washington attempt to get on the environmental bandwagon.
He was not happy that Muskie was getting all of the environmental credits. And so he held this
colloquium and produced this bill called the National Environmental Policy Act. And needless
to say, it also, I'm not sure whether his bill actually created the Council on Environmental
Quality or not.
Muskie had introduced legislation to create an Office of Environmental Quality in the White
House. But when this bill came out to the Senate, Muskie was furious that this bill would come
out of a committee other than his own. And one of the things that I learned, that if you really
wanted to get Muskie engaged on an issue, raise jurisdictional questions because he was very,
very protective of his jurisdiction, which is an entirely, there are several stories about that. But

he told the floor leadership that he wanted to put a hold on the National Environmental Policy
Act, and he did not want it to pass.
And my memory's a little fuzzy here, but one day Dick Royce was on the floor, supposedly
protecting the committee's interest, and Jackson came over and called up NEPA. And Royce
either was distracted, or more likely agreed to let it go, and it passed. And I think that was, I
mean, Muskie was so angry at the leadership that didn't honor his hold, that Jackson would,
quote, “sneak over there” and he and Scoop didn't have a great relationship anyway. Jackson
would, quote, “sneak over there” and get this thing through.
So when Dingell amended the bill to put the Council of Environmental Quality on it in the House
and sent it back with a request for a conference, and Muskie blocked the appointment of
conferees. And he blocked the appointment of conferees for, my recollection is, several months.
Finally, one day Muskie's on the floor, I'm on the floor, Mansfield beckons me over and says,
“Ask Ed to come out to the lobby.” So I go back there and I say, “Senator Muskie, Senator
Mansfield would like to see you out in the lobby.” So we go out there and here's Scoop Jackson
sitting on the couch, and he [Mike Mansfield] says to Muskie, he says, “Ed, sit down. Leon, you
might as well sit down, too. Now boys, you are embarrassing the Senate. I want to resolve this
issue.” And, I mean, you know, it was, you know, I mean I knew Scoop Jackson very well and
actually he and I got along very well. But you know that those two, for whatever animosity they
might have, the institution of the Senate was more important to them than anything else.
So then we began to engage, if you recall, in shuttle diplomacy between you and Muskie and
Scoop Jackson, and I was the, I'd go see Scoop, then go back and see Muskie. And in essence
not only did Muskie rewrite the National Environmental Policy Act, but he did something I've
never seen done before. And that is, that in return for allowing Jackson to appoint conferees, he
had to, Jackson had to, agree to come back from conference with Muskie's amendments, the
most important of which was that the Environmental Impact Statement. A statement, not a
finding, because Muskie saw this as a way for agencies who wanted to destroy the environment
to justify their actions. And to require that that, the draft of that statement be circulated to
environmental agencies, and, state and local as well as federal, and that the comments of those
agencies circulate with the draft throughout the process. And anyone who's dealt with NEPA in
the ensuing thirty years will realize that those three changes made NEPA the law that it is, I
mean it would have been a nothing without it.
Jackson went back to conference, and the, and Dingell, who was not then on Commerce, he was
on the Merchant Marine Fisheries Committee, and he may have been chairman or whatever, but
this bill would come out of Merchant Marine Fisheries, was furious at being told that in order to
get his bill through, he had to accept amendments from the Senate, that, he'd never seen it, I
mean, the Senate was amending their own bill in conference? So there was a meeting, again in
the Secretary of the Senate's office. Scoop asked Muskie to meet with Dingell and the House
conferees, so the, everybody was there but Dingell, and DN:

Including Scoop.

LB:

Including Scoop, and I think, you know, the Interior committee staff and, I mean I can't

remember who all the conferees were. But there came a moment in which people wanted to get
started, and Muskie said something like, he predicated his sentence and then he said, John
Dingell, and he was going to say 'gets here', and the minute he said Dingell, as he said “John
Dingell”, Dingell burst through the door. And he went ballistic about coming into a meeting
having some sonofabitch talking about him, when in fact what Muskie was trying to do was
reserve his rights to be in the meeting. And that led to a disastrous relationship between the two
that went on through Muskie's history in the United States Senate.
DN: I think, as a matter of fact, the difficulties in that relationship started before, and it's quite
likely that Dingell's reaction was based on the antipathy.
LB: Could well have been, I don't know where it would have come from, but it was clearly, I
mean Dingell was ready to, whether it was this issue or if there was something more that you're
aware of, he was furious that Muskie was screwing with this bill. He didn't like the style and
everything else, and when Muskie was saying his name that gave him the basis for just going
ballistic.
DN: I'd have to go back and check the record, but I think he took the side of the auto
companies on some of the earlier Clean Air legislation.
LB: He might have. There's no, he wasn't on the Committee of Jurisdiction, and it wasn't until
'77 when he was on the Committee of Jurisdiction, and he got on there because he prevailed on
an amendment in the House floor. But the only, Dingell would be reasonably cordial to Muskie
in later years. But he wasn't at all, it took him twenty-five years before he was reasonably
cordial to me.
DN: Yeah, very tough. And given his place in the Polish American community, and Muskie's
prominence, it’s worth going back and taking a look at that relationship.
LB: Yeah, it was not . . . . Anyway, so the history of NEPA is not one that has really emit-, I
mean I've written some speeches and I may have put it in an article or two, but. It's important
because it showed, I mean the, I think one of the words that he personally insisted on was
'detailed' environmental impact, and I think detailed environmental impact statement, I think
those were his words. I don't know whether you had any role in that or not, but I recall
specifically a discussion on the floor where he said, “I want the word detailed in there,” and so it
was an ongoing negotiation.
DN:

That would be essentially Ed who would insist on that.

LB:

So that takes us through '70, interesting year.

DN: During that period, and probably we should wind up given your schedule, during that
period, had Russell Train come on the scene, and were you dealing with him, or did that come
later?
LB:

Well, '70 was Ruckelshaus. Train was at CEQ [Council on Environmental Quality]. The

EPA was created in December 6th or 7th or 8th of 1975. The executive order, reorganization
plan that created it, became effective I think on that day. And Ruckelshaus was the first
administrator, and then Train succeeded him. Train was appointed head of CEQ sometime in
1970, because the National Environmental Policy Act was enacted well before the Clean Air Act
The Train influence, which, you know, we need to talk about at some point, the 1972 Clean
Water Act and the role that John Tunney played, and the role Russell Train played, the role of
the 1899 Refuse Act and the way Muskie used that to leverage a regulatory program that still
works. And the relationship between Muskie and Train, which was one of the best, you know.
I've always said that Russell Train was the best administrator EPA ever had. Russell used to talk
about, he'd say, you know, “I don't go to the White House very often because I know when I go
I've got to win.” And Ruckelshaus used to say, “Well, I'd go there and I'd talk to Nixon. I'd go
in and I'd sit down and he'd start asking me about precinct officials and county chairs in
Indiana.” And, I said, he said, “He remembered every one of them, wanted to talk about them.
He didn't want to spend thirty seconds on what I was doing with the EPA, he didn't give a
damn.”
DN: Why don't we pause here, because going beyond the 1970 work is a lot of detail, both on
the substantive side and then on the political side, and that really should LB: Yeah, because we got to get in, you know, when we get into '71, '72, we get into the heat
of the campaign. We get into the Clean Water Act, we get into . . . . I'm not even sure my
mind's capable of organizing all that stuff, but I'll try it.
DN:

Well, we'll try it on another day, earlier in the day. Thank you.

End of Interview

